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A public domain work is an orphan. No one is responsible for its life. But 
everyone exploits its use, until that time certain when it becomes soiled and 
haggard, barren of its previous virtues. Who, then, will invest the funds to 
renovate and nourish its future life when no one owns it? How does the 
consumer benefit from that scenario? The answer is, there is no benefit. 
-Jack Valentil 
The copyright law on the books is a large aggregation of specific statutory 
provisions; it goes on and on for pages and pages. When most people talk 
about copyright, though, they don't mean the long complicated statute 
codified in title I7 of the U.S. Code. Most people's idea of copyright law 
takes the form of a collection of principles and norms. They understand 
that those principles are expressed, if sometimes imperfectly, in the statu-
tory language and the case law interpreting it, but they tend to believe that 
the underlying principles are what count. It is, thus, unsurprising that the 
rhetoric used in copyright litigation and copyright lobbying is more often 
drawn from the principles than the provisions. 
One can greatly overstate the influence that underlying principles can 
exercise over the enactment and interpretation of the nitty-gritty provi-
sions of substantive law. In the ongoing negotiations among industry rep-
resentatives, normative arguments about the nature of copyright show up 
as rhetorical flourishes, but, typically, change nobody's mind. Still, norma-
tive understandings of copyright exercise some constraints on the actual 
legal provisions that the lobbyists can come up with, agree on, convince 
Congress to pass, and persuade outsiders to comply with. The ways we have 
From Digital Copyright by Jessica Litman (2oo6) pp. 77-88. (Amherst, NY: Prometheus 
Books).Copyright © 2001 by Jessica Litman.Reprinted with permission of the publisher. 
!3 
14 ORIGINALITY, IMITATION, AND PLAGIARISM 
of thinking about copyright law can at least make some changes more 
difficult to achieve than others. 
Lawyers, lobbyists, and scholars in a host of disciplines have reexam-
ined and reformulated copyright principles over the past generation, in 
ways that have expanded copyright's scope and blinded many of us to the 
dangers that arise from protecting too much, too expansively for too long. 
That transformation has facilitated the expansion of copyright protection 
and the narrowing of copyright limitations and exceptions. 
At the turn of the century, when Congress first embraced the copyright 
conference model that was to trouble us for the rest of the century, the pre-
dominant metaphor for copyright was the notion of a quid pro quo.2 The 
public granted authors limited exclusive rights (and only if the authors 
fulfilled a variety of formal conditions) in return for the immediate public 
dissemination of the work and the eventual dedication of the work in its 
entirety to the public domain.3 
As the United States got less hung up on formal prerequisites, that 
model evolved to a view of copyright as a bargain in which the public 
granted limited exclusive rights to authors as a means to advance the pub-
lic interest. This model was about compensation:4 it focused on copyright 
as a way to permit authors to make enough money from the works they cre-
ated in order to encourage them to create the works and make them avail-
able to the public. That view of the law persisted until fairly recently. 
If you read books, articles, legal briefs, and congressional testimony 
about copyright written by scholars and lawyers and judges fifty years ago, 
you find widespread agreement that copyright protection afforded only 
shallow and exception-ridden control over protected works. Forty, thirty, 
even twenty years ago, it was an article of faith that the nature of copyright 
required that it offer only circumscribed, porous protection to works of 
authorship. The balance between protection and the material that copy-
right left unprotected was thought to be the central animating principle of 
the law. Copyright was a bargain between the public and the author, 
whereby the public bribed the author to create new works in return for lim-
ited commercial control over the new expression the author brought to her 
works. The public's payoff was that, beyond the borders of the authors' 
defined exclusive rights, it was entitled to enjoy, consume, learn from, and 
reuse the works. Even the bounded copyright rights would expire after a 
limited term, then set at fifty-six years. 
A corollary of the limited protection model was that copyright gave 
owners control only over particular uses of their works. 5 The copyright 
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owner had exclusive rights to duplicate the work. Publishing and public 
performance were within the copyright owner's control. But copyright 
never gave owners any control over reading, or private performance, or 
resale of a copy legitimately owned, or learning from and talking about and 
writing about a work, because those were all part of what the public gained 
from its bargain. Thus, the fact that copyright protection lasted for a very 
long time (far longer than the protection offered by patents); the fact that 
copyright protection has never required a government examination for 
originality, creativity, or merit; and the fact that copyright protects works 
that have very little of any of them was defended as harmless: because 
copyright never took from the public any of the raw material it might need 
to use to create new works of authorship, the dangers arising from over-
protection ranged from modest to trivial. 
There was nearly universal agreement on these points through the mid-
I970S. Copyright was seen as designed to be full of holes. The balance 
underlying that view of the copyright system treated the interests of owners 
of particular works (and often those owners were not the actual authors) as 
potentially in tension with the interests of the general public, including the 
authors of the future; the theory of the system was to adjust that balance so 
that each of the two sides got at least as much as it needed. 6 In economic 
terms, neither the author nor the public was entitled to appropriate the 
entire surplus generated by a new work of authorship.? Rather, they shared 
the proceeds, each entitled to claim that portion of them that would best 
encourage the promiscuous creation of still newer works of authorship. 
If you're dissatisfied with the way the spoils are getting divided, one 
approach is to change the rhetoric. When you conceptualize the law as a 
balance between copyright owners and the public, you set up a particular 
dichotomy-some would argue, a false dichotomy8-that constrains the 
choices you are likely to make. If copyright law is a bargain between 
authors and the public, then we might ask what the public is getting from 
the bargain. If copyright law is about a balance between owners' control of 
the exploitation of their works and the robust health of the public domain, 
one might ask whether the system strikes the appropriate balance.9 You 
can see how, at least in some quarters, this talk about bargains and balance 
might make trouble. Beginning in the late 1970s and early 1980s, advocates 
of copyright owners began to come up with different descriptions of the 
nature of copyright, with an eye to enabling copyright owners to capture a 
greater share of the value embodied in copyright-protected works. 10 
In the last thirty years, the idea of a bargain has gradually been replaced 
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by a model drawn from the economic analysis of law, which characterizes 
copyright as a system of incentives.11 Today, this is the standard economic 
model of copyright law, whereby copyright provides an economic incen-
tive for the creation and distribution of original works of authorship. 12 The 
model derives a lot of its power from its simplicity: it posits a direct rela-
tionship between the extent of copyright protection and the amount of 
authorship produced and distributed-any increase in the scope or subject 
matter or duration of copyright will cause an increase in authorship; any 
reduction will cause a reduction. 
The economic analysis model focuses on the effect greater or lesser 
copyright rights might have on incentives to create and exploit new works. 
It doesn't bother about stuff like balance or bargains except as they might 
affect the incentive structure for creating and exploiting new works. To jus-
tify copyright limitations, like fair use, under this model, you need to argue 
that authors and publishers need them in order to create new works of 
authorship,B rather than, say, because that's part of the public's share of 
the copyright bargain. The model is not rooted in compensation, and so it 
doesn't ask how broad a copyright would be appropriate or fair; instead it 
inquires whether broader, longer, or stronger copyright protection would 
be likely to lead to the production of more works of authorship. 
The weakness in this model is that more and stronger and longer copy-
right protection will always, at the margin, cause more authors to create 
more works-that's how this sort of linear model operates. If we forget that 
the model is just a useful thought tool, and persuade ourselves that it 
straightforwardly describes the real world, then we're trapped in a con-
struct in which there's no good reason why copyrights shouldn't cover 
everything and last forever. 
Lately, that's what seems to have happened. Copyright legislation has 
recently been a one-way ratchet, and it's hard to argue that that's bad 
within the confines of the conventional way of thinking about copyright. 
In the past several years we've seen a further evolution. Copyright today is 
less about incentives or compensation than it is about contro1. 14 What 
ended up persuading lawmakers to adopt that model was the conversion of 
copyright into a trade issue: The content industries, copyright owners 
argued, were among the few in which the United States had a favorable bal-
ance of trade. Instead of focusing on American citizens who engaged in 
unlicensed uses of copyrighted works (many of them legal under U.S. law), 
they drew Congress's attention to people and businesses in other countries 
who engaged in similar uses. The United States should make it a top prior-
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ity, they argued, to beef up domestic copyright law at home, and thus 
ensure that people in other countries paid for any use of copyrighted works 
abroad. U.S. copyright law does not apply beyond U.S. borders, but sup-
porters of expanded copyright protection argued that by enacting stronger 
copyright laws, Congress would set a good example for our trading part-
ners, who could then be persuaded to do the same. Proponents of en-
hanced protection changed the story of copyright from a story about 
authors and the public collaborating on a bargain to promote the progress 
of learning, into a story about Americans trying to protect their property 
from foreigners trying to steal it. 
That story sold. It offered an illusion that, simply by increasing the 
scope and strength and duration of U.S. copyright protection, Congress 
could generate new wealth for America without detriment or even incon-
venience to any Americans. That recasting of the copyright story persuaded 
Congress to "improve" copyright protection and cut back on limitations 
and exceptions. 1s 
The upshot of the change in the way we think about copyright is that 
the dominant metaphor is no longer that of a bargain between authors and 
the public. We talk now of copyright as property that the owner is entitled 
to control-to sell to the public (or refuse to sell) on whatever terms the 
owner chooses. Copyright has been transformed into the right of a prop-
erty owner to protect what is rightfully hers. (That allows us to skip right 
past the question of what it is, exactly, that ought to be rightfully hers.) 
And the current metaphor is reflected both in recent copyright amend-
ments now on the books and in the debate over what those laws mean and 
whether they go too far. 
One example of this trend is the piecemeal repeal of the so-called first-
sale doctrine, which historically permitted the purchaser of a copy of a 
copyrighted work to sell, loan, lease, or display the copy without the copy-
right owner's permission, and is the reason why public libraries, video 
rental stores, and art galleries are not illegal. 16 The first sale doctrine 
enhanced public access to copyrighted works that some were unable to pur-
chase. Because the first sale doctrine applies only to copies of a copyrighted 
work, it became increasingly irrelevant in a world in which vast numbers of 
works were disseminated to the public through media such as television 
and radio, which involved no transfer of copies. Copyright owners who did 
distribute copies of their works, however, lobbied for the first sale doc-
trine's repeal. Congress yielded to the entreaties of the recording industry 
to limit the first sale doctrine as it applied to records, cassette tapes, and 
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compact discs in 1984, and enacted an amendment that made commercial 
record rental (but not loan or resale) illegal. 17 After the computer software 
industry's attempts to evade the operation of the first sale doctrine-by 
claiming that their distribution of software products involved licenses 
rather than sales18-received an unenthusiastic reception in court, 19 Con-
gress partially repealed the first sale doctrine as it applied to computer pro-
grams.20 Bills to repeal the first sale doctrine for audio/visual works were 
introduced in Congress,2' but never accumulated enough support to be 
enacted. The actual bites these laws took out of the first sale doctrine were 
small ones, but in the process, the principle that the doctrine represents 
has been diminished. 
If we no longer insist that people who own legitimate copies of works 
be permitted to do what they please with them, that presents an opportu-
nity to attack a huge realm of unauthorized but not illegal use. If copyright 
owners can impose conditions on the act of gaining access, and back those 
conditions up with either technological devices, or legal prohibitions, or 
both, then copyright owners can license access to and use of their works on 
a continuing basis. Technological fences, such as passwords or encryption, 
offer some measure of control, and enhanced opportunities to extract value 
from the use of a work. The owner of the copyright in money management 
software, for example, could design the software to require purchasers of 
copies to authorize a small credit card charge each time they sought to run 
the program. The owner of the copyright in recorded music could release 
the recording in a scrambled format, and rent access to descramblers by the 
day. Technological controls, though, are vulnerable to technological eva-
sion, which is where the part about legal controls comes in. 
When copyright owners demanded the legal tools to restrict owners of 
legitimate copies of works from gaining access to them, Congress was 
receptive. Copyright owner interests argued that, in a digital age, anyone 
with access to their works could commit massive violations of their copy-
rights with a single keystroke by transmitting unauthorized copies all over 
the Internet. In order for their rights to mean anything, copyright owners 
insisted, they were entitled to have control over access to their works-not 
merely initial access, but continuing control over every subsequent act of 
gaining access to the content of a work.22 Thus, to protect their property 
rights, the law needed to be amended to prohibit individuals from gaining 
unauthorized access to copyrighted works.23 
Augmenting copyright law with legally enforceable access control 
could completely annul the first sale doctrine. More fundamentally, 
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enforceable access control has the potential to redesign the copyright land-
scape completely. The hallmark of legal rights is that they can be carefully 
calibrated. Copyright law can give authors control over the initial distribu-
tion of a copy of a work, without permitting the author to exercise down-
stream control over who gets to see it. Copyright law can give authors con-
trol over the use of the words and pictures in their books without giving 
them rights to restrict the ideas and facts those words and pictures express. 
It can give them the ability to collect money for the preface and notes they 
add to a collection of Shakespeare's plays without allowing them to assert 
any rights in the text of those plays. It can permit them to control repro-
ductions of their works without giving them the power to restrict con-
sumption of their works. Leaving eye-tracks on a page has never been 
deemed to be copyright infringement. 
Copyrighted works contain protected and unprotected elements, and 
access to those works may advance restricted or unrestricted uses. Access 
controls are not so discriminating. Once we permit copyright owners to 
exert continuing control over consumers' access to the contents of their 
works, there is no way to ensure that access controls will not prevent con-
sumers from seeing the unprotected facts and ideas in a work. Nor can we 
make certain that the access controls prevent uses that the law secures to 
the copyright owner, while permitting access when its purpose is to facili-
tate a use the law permits. If the law requires that we obtain a license when-
ever we wish to read protected text, it encourages copyright owners to 
restrict the availability of licenses whenever it makes economic sense for 
them to do so. That, in turn, makes access to the ideas, facts, and other 
unprotected elements contingent on copyright holders' marketing plans, 
and puts the ability of consumers to engage in legal uses of the material in 
those texts within the copyright holders' unconstrained discretion. In 
essence, that's an exclusive right to use. In other words, in order to effec-
tively protect authors' "exclusive rights" to their writings, which is to say, 
control, we need to give them power to permit or prevent any use that 
might undermine their control. What that means is that a person who buys 
a copy of a work may no longer have the right to read and reread it, loan it, 
resell it, or give it away. But the law has been moving away from that prin-
ciple for years. 
A second example of this trend is the campaign to contract the fair-use 
privilege. Fair use was once understood as the flip side of the limited scope 
of copyright.24 The copyright law gave the copyright holder exclusive con-
trol over reproductions of the work, but not over all reproductions. 25 The 
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justifications for fair use were various; a common formulation explained 
that reasonable appropriations of protected works were permissible when 
they advanced the public interest without inflicting unacceptably grave 
damage on the copyright owner. Fair use was appropriate in situations 
when the copyright owner would be likely to authorize the use but it would 
be a great deal of trouble to ask for permission, such as the quotation of 
excerpts of a novel in a favorable review or the use of selections from a 
scholarly article in a subsequent scholarly article building on the first 
author's research. Fair use was also appropriate in situations when the 
copyright owner would be unlikely to authorize, such as parodies and cri-
tiques, under a justification Prof. Alan Latman described as "enforced con-
sent." The social interest in allowing uses that criticized the copyright 
owner's work, for example, outweighed the copyright owner's reluctance 
to permit them. Fair use was appropriate whenever such uses were custom-
ary, either under the implied-consent rubric or as a matter of enforced con-
sent. Fair use was finally asserted to be the reason that a variety of uses that 
come within the technical boundaries of the exclusive rights in the copy-
right bundle, but were difficult to prevent, like private copying, would not 
be actionable. 26 
Recent reformulations of the fair use privilege, however, have sought to 
confine it to the implied-assent justification. Where copyright owners 
would not be likely to authorize the use free of charge, the use should no 
longer be fair. The uses that were permitted because they were difficult to 
police are claimed to be a subset of the impliedly permitted uses; should 
copyright owners devise a mechanism for licensing those uses, there 
would, similarly, no longer be any need to excuse the uses as fair. 27 In its 
most extreme form, this argument suggests that fair use itself is an archaic 
privilege with little application to the digital world: where technology per-
mits automatic licensing, legal fictions based on "implied assent" become 
unnecessary.28 Limiting fair use to an implied assent rationale, moreover, 
makes access controls seem more appealing. Thus, the fact that access con-
trols would make no exception for individuals to gain access in order to 
make fair use of a work is said to be unproblematic. Why should fair use be 
a defense for the act of gaining unauthorized access? 
By recasting traditional limitations on the scope of copyright as loop-
holes, proponents of stronger protection have managed to put the cham-
pions of limited protection on the defensive. Why, after all, should unde-
sirable loopholes not now be plugged? Instead of being viewed as altruists 
seeking to assert the public's side of the copyright bargain, library organi-
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zations, for example, are said to be giving aid and comfort to pirates. 
Instead of being able to claim that broad prohibitions on technological 
devices are bad technological policy, opponents of the copyright-as-control 
model are painted as folks who believe that it ought to be okay to steal 
books rather than to buy them. And when educators have argued that 
everyone is losing sight of the rights that the law gives the public, they 
have met the response that the copyright law has never asked authors to 
subsidize education by donating their literary property. 
Then there's the remarkable expansion of what we call piracy. Piracy 
used to be about folks who made and sold large numbers of counterfeit 
copies. Today, the term "piracy" seems to describe any unlicensed activ-
ity-especially if the person engaging in it is a teenager. The content indus-
try calls some behavior piracy despite the fact that it is unquestionably 
legal. When a consumer makes a noncommercial recording of music by, for 
example, taping a CD she has purchased or borrowed from a friend, her 
copying comes squarely within the privilege established by the Audio 
Home Recording Act. The record companies persist in calling that copying 
piracy even though the statute deems it lawfuL29 
People on the content owners' side of this divide explain that it is tech-
nology that has changed penny-ante unauthorized users into pirates, but 
that's not really it at all. These "pirates" are doing the same sort of things 
unlicensed users have always done-making copies of things for their own 
personal use, sharing their copies with their friends, or reverse-engineering 
the works embodied on the copies to figure out how they work. What's 
changed is the epithet we apply to them. 
If we untangle the claim that technology has turned Johnny Teenager 
into a pirate, what turns out to be fueling it is the idea that if Johnny 
Teenager were to decide to share his unauthorized copy with two million 
of his closest friends, the effect on a record company would be pretty simi-
lar to the effect of some counterfeit CD factory's creating two million CDs 
and selling them cheap. Copyright owners are worried, and with good rea-
son. But, in response to their worry, they've succeeded in persuading a lot 
of people that any behavior that has the same effect as piracy must be 
piracy, and must therefore reflect the same moral turpitude we attach to 
piracy, even if it is the same behavior that we all called legitimate before. 
Worse, any behavior that could potentially cause the same effect as piracy, 
even if it doesn't, must also be piracy. Because an unauthorized digital copy 
of something could be uploaded to the Internet, where it could be down-
loaded by two million people, even making the digital copy is piracy. 
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Because an unauthorized digital copy of something could be used in a way 
that could cause all that damage, making a tool that makes it possible to 
make an unauthorized digital copy, even if nobody ever actually makes 
one, is itself piracy, regardless of the reasons one might have for making 
this tool. And what could possibly be wrong with a law designed to prevent 
piracy? 
My argument, here, is that this evolution in metaphors conceals 
immense sleight of hand. We as a society never actually sat down and dis-
cussed in policy terms whether, now that we had grown from a copyright-
importing nation to a copyright-exporting nation, we wanted to recreate 
copyright as a more expansive sort of control. Instead, by changing 
metaphors, we somehow got snookered into believing that copyright had 
always been intended to offer content owners extensive control, only, 
before now, we didn't have the means to enforce it. 
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